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Grubman: What a Relief? The Availability of Habeas Relief Under the Saving
WHAT A RELIEF? THE AVAILABILITY OF HABEAS RELIEF UNDER THE
SAVINGS CLAUSE OF SECTION 2255 OF THE AEDPA
Scott R. Grubman*

In Gilbert v. United States, a majority of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the savings clause contained in § 2255 of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) does not authorize a federalprisoner
to bring in a habeas petition a claim, which the AEDP 4's ban on second or
successive motions would otherwise bar, that the sentencing guidelines were
misapplied in a way that resulted in a longer sentence not exceeding the
statutory maximum. The inajorityjbcusedon finality interests and worried that
allowing a prisoner to avoid the 4EDP4 's ban on second or successive motions
would lead to abuse and delay. Some, including the Gilbert dissenters, have
expressed concerns that denying a prisoner relief where a subsequent, but
retroactively applicable, change in the law renders that prisoner's sentence
incorrect or invalid could result in constitutional violations. This Article
attempts to get past the rhetoricfrom both sides of the debate and proposes a
middle-ground approach that would pacib@ both the administrative and
constitutionalconcerns that have been raised.
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INTRODUCTION

Known as the "Great Writ," the writ of habeas corpus, from the founding of
our nation, has played a central role in our system of justice. Constitutional
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scholar Erwin Chemerinsky has referred to it as "one of the most, if not the
single most, important part of the Constitution which protects individual rights." 2
Borrowed from English common law, the writ of habeas corpus was once
referred to by William Blackstone as "the most celebrated writ in the English
law."3 It was important enough to America's Founding Fathers that it was
expressly included in the Constitution, and the first Congress, in the very Act
that created the American judiciary, expressly gave federal judges the power to
grant writs of habeas corpus.4 Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution provides:
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."- At
least one of the Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, believed that the
Constitution should contain affirmative provisions dealing with habeas corpus
and criticized the Framers' decision not to include any such provision.6
Despite the vital role that the Writ has played in American criminal
jurisprudence, it has not been without its problems. In 1988, in the face of
growing concern and criticism regarding the ineffectiveness of habeas procedure,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist created the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, known informally as the Powell Committee.7
Chief Justice Rehnquist asked the committee "to inquire into 'the necessity and
desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality'
in capital cases."' The Powell Committee eventually issued a report in which it
observed several problems with the then-existing system of habeas, including
delay, repetition, and the lack of finality.9 Despite this report, howxever,
Congress took several more years to pass any meaningful habeas reform.10
In 1996, in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).'
The AEDPA
transformed post-conviction collateral relief procedures and limitations in

I. Jennifer Ponder, The Attorney General's Power of Certification Regarding State
Mechanisns to Opt-in to Streamlined Habeas Corpus Procedure, 6 CRIM. L. BRIEF. Fall 2010. at
38, 39.
2.
Erwir Chemerinsky Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 749
(1987).
3.
Id at 748 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMNMENTARIES *129).
4.
Id (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, §9, cl. 2: Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat.
385 (1867)); Ponder, supra note 1, at 39.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, 9, cl. 2.
6.
Donald P. Lay, The Writ ofHabeas Corpus: A Complex Procedurefor a Simple Process,

77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1993).
7. Id. at 1048 (citing AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMNITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL 1 (1989) [hereinafter
POWELL REPORT]).
8.
Id. (quoting POWELL REPORT, supra note 7, at 1).
9. Id. (citing POWELL REPORT, supra note 7, at 2 3).
10. See id at 1063; Ponder, supra note 1. at 40 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110 Stat. 1214, 1221-26 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2261 2266) (1996)).
11. Ponder, supra note 1, at 40 (citing § 107).
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several extremely important ways.12 This Article focuses on one of the major
limitations that the AEDPA places on prisoners seeking post-conviction
collateral relief-the ban on "second or successive" petitions absent special
circumstances.
Part 11 of this Article will offer an abridged history of habeas.
Part III will discuss the AEDPA's clamp down on second or successive habeas
petitions 1in more detail, including the requirements that a prisoner must satisfy
in order to bring such a petition. Part IV will discuss situations where a prisoner
with a legitimate claim that his sentence was incorrect or somehow invalidbased on intervening changes in the law-might fall through the cracks and be
left with no remedy, as a recent case decided by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals illustrates.1
I will discuss the concerns raised by both sides of the
debate: on one side, concerns that allowing prisoners to skirt the AEDPA's
restrictions on second or successive petitions for collateral relief would destroy
the all-important interest of finality of judgment; and on the other side, concerns
that where the petitioner is denied relief in such unique situations, the AEDPA's
restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions may violate the Suspension
Clause of Article 1, as well as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. I will attempt to get past the rhetoric on both sides,
and suggest a middle-ground approach that would pacify both sides' concerns.
II. AN

ABRIDGED HiSTORY OF HABEAS

The first known use of the writ of habeas corpus was in 1305 tinder the reign
of King Edward I.16 The writ was first codified in 1640, and first issued by a
court of common pleas in London, England, in 1670, in connection with the trial

12. See generally John 1. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite." 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 259, 270-71 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006)) (discussing several provisions of the
AEDPA and how they affect habeas procedure); James S. Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"?
AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 416-17 (2001) (citations
omitted) (same).
13. See § 2244(b) (dealing with state prisoners); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2011) (dealing with
federal prisoners).
14. See supra note 13. Although federal prisoners seeking relief under § 2255 are not
technically "habeas petitioners," but are instead movants under the statute, because of the high
degree of relatedness between habeas petitions and § 2255 motions, I will often refer to both as
petitions for habeas corpus. For more detail on the distinction, and relatedness, of habeas petitions
and § 2255 motions, see infra note 105.
15. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
16. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comnity, Finality, and Federalismn, 82 TUL. L. REV.
443, 446 n.9 (2007).
17. Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The Right to Habeas Corpus in
InternationalConstitutionalLaw. 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 551, 555 (2009) (citing 1640, 16 Car. 1.
c. 10 (Eng.)); James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 BuFF. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2008)
(citing 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (Eng.)).
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of William Penn and William Meade.18 News of the events surrounding this trial
reached the American colonies, eventually resulting in several colonies adopting
the writ as part of their colonial charter or through legislation or their
constitution.
At the Constitutional Convention, there was some debate amongst the
Framers as to whether to include a provision dealing with habeas in the federal
Constitution. 20 Such a provision was first proposed by Charles Pinckney.
Eventually, the Framers decided not to include an affirmative guarantee of the
writ but instead settled on a provision that prohibited the writ's suspension.
Just over two years after the Constitutional Convention, in its first session, the
first Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, section 14 of which granted
federal courts the power to issue habeas writs.23
At first, only prisoners in federal custody could petition a federal court for
habeas relief.24 Moreover, even federal prisoners were limited as to the relief
they could obtain through a habeas petition-a habeas court could only review
whether the court that convicted the prisoner had competent jurisdiction; once it
found that it did, the inquiry ended and relief was denied. Congress expanded
the writ for the first time in 1833, allowing state prisoners who were being held

18. Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337,
336-37 (1983) (citing Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.) 1018; Godfrey Lehman,
Gentlemen ofthe Jury, LBERTY, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 20, 22).
19. Id at 338 (citing Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2. c. 2 (Eng.)). Judge Rosein notes
that the constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Georgia all incorporated the writ in
some respect. Id. at 338 n.14 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XV, MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6,
art. VII; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 91).
20. Id at 338-39 (citing Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional
Right or Legislative Grace?. 40 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 339 & n.6 (1952)); see also Marc D. Falkoff,
Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L.
REV.

961,

981

(2009)

(quoting JAMES MADISON.

NOTES OF DEBATES

IN THE FEDERAL

CONVENTION OF 1787, at 541 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES])
(describing how some of the Framers did not think it necessary to include suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in the Constitution).
21. Falkoff, supra note 20, at 981 (quoting MADISON'S NOTES. supra note 20, at 485-86).
22. Rosenn, supra note 18, at 338 (Citing U.S. CONST. art I, 9, cl. 2); see also Peter Hack,
[ie Roads Less Traveled Post Conviction Relief Alternatives and the Antiterrorism and Eftective
Death Penalty Act of 1996. 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171. 174 (2003) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I. § 9, cl.
2) (explaining how the Framers decided to adopt the current text of the Suspension Clause).
23. Medberry v. Crosby 351 F.3d 1049, 1055 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82);
Rosenn, supra note 18, at 339 (citing Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20. § 14. 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241)).
24. Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845) (noting a federal court's inability to
issue a writ of habeas corpus where a prisoner is in state custody); Rosenn, supra note 18, at 340.
25. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830) ("The judgment of a court of
record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court
would be. It is as conclusive on this court as it is on other courts. It puts an end to inquiry
concerning the fact, by deciding it."); Rosenn, supra note 18, at 340.
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for an act that they committed pursuant to federal law to file habeas petitions. 26
Another expansion came in 1842, this time to allow for petitions from foreign
nationals detained by a state in violation of a treaty. Finally, in 1867, Congress
overruled Exparte Dorr28 and expanded the writ once again, making it available
to "any

person . . . restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the

constitution ... or law of the United States."
Despite Congress's expansion of the writ in 1867, courts continued to limit
their habeas power based on the idea that a habeas court could review only the
jurisdiction of the court of conviction.30 To alleviate this problem, the Supreme
Court, in a line of cases spanning the 1870s and 1880s, expanded the definition
of "lack of jurisdiction."'
These cases allowed for habeas relief where the
32
Double Jeopardy Clause was violated, the defendant was charged with
violating an unconstitutional statute, or the petitioner was convicted without an
indictment from a grand j ury.
The jurisdictional limitation continued until 1915, when the Supreme Court
decided Frank v. Mangum. The defendant in Frank filed a habeas petition in
federal court alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
rights during his state criminal trial.
The Frank Court expanded habeas
jurisdiction to cover state prisoners challenging their convictions based on
alleged constitutional violations but limited such relief "to those constitutional
claims that had not been decided in the state courts." 37 Nearly thirty years later,
in WJaley v. Johnston,38 the Supreme Court finally eliminated the jurisdictional
defect limitation for good.
As Judge Rosenn noted, "After WJaley a habeas
petitioner no longer needed to base his complaint on defects in jurisdiction. The
habeas court was free to inquire into the circumstances of the state court

26. Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congressional Power to
Remove Issuesfrom the FederalCourts. 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1280 (2007) (citing Act of Mar. 2.
1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634 35 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (2006))).
27. See id (citing Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at
§ 2241(c)(4))).
28. 44 U.S. (31-ow.) 103 (1845).
29. Rosenn, supra note 18, at 341 (quoting Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3))) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Choper & Yoo, supra note 26, at 1280 (citing § 1. 14 Stat. at 385) (noting that it was not until 1867
that Congress "expand[ed] habeas to include cases where prisoners claimed they were held in
violation of federal rights").
30. See Rosenn, supra note 18, at 344 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958
Term-Foreword: [he Time Chart ofthe Justices. 73 H-ARv. L. REV. 84, 103-04 (1959)).
31. See id. (quoting Hart, supra note 30, at 104).
32. See id (citing Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 164 (1873)).
33. See id (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879)).
34. See id. (citing Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885)).
35. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
36. See Frank,237 U.S. at 324-25.
37. Rosenn, supra note 18, at 346.
38. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
39. See Rosenn, supra note 18, at 346 (citing WIaley, 316 U.S. at 104-05).
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proceedings to determine whether the state court had protected the petitioner's
constitutional rights." 40 Approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court, for
the first time, permitted federal habeas review of a state conviction where the

state court had alreadv decided the same issue.41
After ten years of confusion as to when and tinder what circumstances a
federal court could decide issues already addressed by a state court, the Supreme
Court offered guidance in Townsend v. Sain.4 The Townsend Court confirmed a
federal court's power to receive evidence and try facts de novo where the habeas
petition "alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief."4
The Court went on to formulate a test for when a federal habeas court is required
to grant an evidentiary hearing.44 Pursuant to Townsend, such a hearing is
required if one of the following criteria is met:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material
facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for
any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.4
In the words of Judge Rosenn, "Beginning as a rivulet during the early
Colonial days, the Great Writ had now become a mighty river that served as a
powerful force in the preservation of personal liberties."46 However, many

40. Id
41. See id (citing Brown v. Allen. 344 U.S. 443, 485-86 (1953)).
42. Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293, 310 (1963); see also David D. Jividen, 4ill the Dike
Burst? Plugging the UnconstitutionalHole in Article 66(c), UCMJ, 38 A.F. L. REV. 63, 100 (1994)
(quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313) (discussing the holding in Townsend and the named factors
entitling a state habeas corpus applicant to a federal evidentiary hearing).
43. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312; see also Jividen, supra note 42, at 100 (citing Townsend, 372
U.S. at 312) (discussing the holding of Townsend).
44. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.
45. Id. On the same day that it decided Townsend, the Court also decided Fay v. Noia.
Rosenn, supra note 18, at 352 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). The petitioner in Fay was
convicted of murder in state court based solely on wvhat the petitioner characterized as an
involuntary confession. Id (citing Fay, 372 U.S. at 394 96). The petitioner purposely let the time
for direct appeal expire and then sought habeas relief in federal court. Id (citing Fay, 3 72 U.S. at
395-96, 439-40). The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the petitioner was entitled to
relief in light of his failure to seek direct review by a state court. Id (citing Fay, 372 U.S. at 394).
The Court in Fay concluded that the petitioners actions did not preclude him from seeking habeas
relief in federal court. Id at 353 (citing Fay, 372 U.S. at 398-99). However, the Court in Fay did
hold that a federal district court has the discretion to deny a habeas petitioner relief where that
petitioner "has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts." Id (quoting Fay,
372 U.S. at 438) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Rosenn, supra note 18, at 353.
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commentators and other affected parties criticized this expansion-particularly
state court judges who felt as though a federal court's ability to relitigate factual
issues de novo was an insult to their integrity.47 These concerns led Congress, in
1966, to limit the ability of a federal habeas court to review factual disputes
already litigated in state courts, except in specifically defined situations. 8
Beginning in the early 1970s, during the Nixon administration, the Court
began to tip the scale back in favor of limiting the availability of habeas relief in
federal courts.49 In Stone v. Powello for example, the Court denied habeas
relief to a petitioner who claimed that the state court of conviction admitted
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court in Stone
concluded that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."52 Post-Stone. a
federal habeas court's power to grant relief to a state prisoner alleging a violation
of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was significantly limited.
A year later, the Court limited the availability of habeas relief even further in
Wainwright v. Sykes. 4 The respondent in Wainwright sought review of his state
court conviction on the ground that the state trial court admitted statements that
were allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
The respondent,
however, failed to object to the admissibility of these statements during his trial,
and the trial judge did not raise the issue sua sponte. Even on direct appeal, the
respondent failed to challenge the admission of these statements." Instead, he
raised his Mfiranda challenge for the first time in a motion to vacate the
conviction filed in the state trial court and in a state habeas petition filed in the
state's appellate courts.5 8 These late attempts were unsuccessful.

47. Id at 354.
48. See id. (citing Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1104 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2011))). As discussed in Judge Rosen's article. in order to limit
federal habeas review. Congress amended § 2254(d) of the 1948 habeas statute to list eight
conditions, one of which must be met, in order for a federal habeas court to be able to review factual
determinations already litigated and decided by a state court. See id. (citing Act of Nov. 2, 1966;
§ 2254(d)).
49. See Rosem, supra note 18, at 355; see also Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need
for Equitable Tolling ofthe Habeas Corpus Statute ofLimitations, 32 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7-8 (2004)
(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976);
Stone, 428 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (discussing the Supreme Court's shift towards
limiting habeas relief during the 1970s).
50. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
51. Rosenn, supra note 18, at 357 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 469, 494).
52. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
53. See Rosenn, supra note 18, at 358.
54. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
55. See id at 75.
56. Id
57. See id.
58. Id.
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The respondent in Wainwright then filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 in federal court.60 Both the district court, as well as the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, concluded that the respondent's failure to object to the
admission of his statements at trial "would only bar review of the suppression
claim where the right to object was deliberately bypassed for reasons relating to
trial tactics,"61 and, after the Fifth Circuit concluded that this was not a deliberate
bypass case, the case was remanded to the state trial court for a hearing on
whether the respondent knowingly waived his Mfiranda rights.62
Reversing, the Supreme Court applied the rule that it had announced one
year prior in Francisv. Henderson63-unless the petitioner could show "cause"
and "prejudice" resulting from a state procedural waiver, federal habeas review
was unavailable where the petitioner waived his objection to the admission of a
confession at trial. 4 The Court purposely did not define "cause" or "prejudice,"
but instead left the task of defining these terms for a later case.65 Without much
discussion, the Court denied the petitioner any relief, concluding that
"[w]hatever precise content may be given those terms by later cases, we feel
confident in holding without further elaboration that they do not exist here."66
Five years later, in Rose v. Lundy67 the Court was presented with a habeas
petitioner who had filed a "mixed petition"-a petition containing both a claim
for which the petitioner has exhausted her state remedies and a claim for which
there was no such exhaustion.68 The Court in Lundy adopted a bright-line rule
requiring exhaustion of all claims and held that a district court was required to
dismiss a mixed petition.69 The Court concluded that where a petitioner filed a
mixed petition, and the district court denied such a petition, the petitioner would
have to choose between going back to state court and exhausting all of the
claims, or submitting a new petition that included exhausted claims only."0
In support of its holding, the Lundy Court noted that the policy behind the
exhaustion rule is "to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal
law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.
The Court held that

59. Id.
60. Id. For a discussion of § 2254, see infi-a notes 92 98 and accompanying text.
61. See id at 75-77 (citations omitted).
62. See id at 77.
63. See id at 87 (citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)). Francis dealt with a
state prisoner's challenge to the composition of the grand jury. Francis,425 U.S. at 537.
64. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87 (citing Francis,425 U.S. at 542); see also Rosenn, supra
note 18, at 358 (citing Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87) (discussing the holding in Waiivright as seen
through the principles established in Francis).
65. See Wainwright,433 U.S. at 87 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963)).
66. Id at 91.
67. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
68. See id. at 510; see also Bellamy, supra note 49, at 8 (citing Lundy, 455 U.S. at 509 10)
(discussing Lundy).
69. See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 510.
70. Id.

71.

Id. at 518.
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its "total exhaustion rule" would ensure that state courts were given the first
chance to examine a petitioner's claims before those claims went to a federal
court for review.
The Court also discussed how its rule would assist federal
courts; in cases where a state petitioner asserting federal claims exhausts his state
remedies before turning to a federal court for review, the factual record is more
likely to be complete and comprehensive.
The next major milestone in habeas corpus jurisprudence came in 1989,
when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Teague v. Lane. 4 The
defendant in Teague was convicted of attempted murder, armed robbery, and
aggravated battery. During jury selection, after the prosecution used all ten of
its peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury, defense
counsel twice moved for a mistrial, and each time was denied.
After being
convicted, Teague filed a direct appeal claiming that the prosecutor's actions
violated his rights tinder the Sixth Amendment. 7 The state appellate courts
rejected his claim, and the United States Supreme Court refused to grant
certiorari.
Teague filed a habeas petition in federal district court but was denied relief
based on his failure to show systematic and purposeful exclusion of AfricanAmericans from juries. While his appeal of the district court's denial of habeas
relief was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Batson v.
Kentucky,80 where it overruled existing precedent and held that a defendant could
make a prima facie showing of discrimination in jury selection by relying solely
on facts concerning its selection in his case, as opposed to having to show
systematic exclusion based on race.8 1 Even after Batson was decided, however,
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Teague's petition,
holding that Batson did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.8
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals,
holding that Batson did not apply to Teague's case.83 The Court in Teague held

72. See id. at 518-19.
73. See id. at 519.
74. 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see also Bellamy, supra note 49, at 8 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. 288)
(discussing Teague); James Basta, Note, Supreme Court Review: Habeas Corpus: Unresolved
Standard of Review on Mixed Questions for State Prisoners.83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 978.
983 n.4 7 (1993) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. 288) (same).
75. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292 93.
76. Id. at 293.
77. See id.
78. Id. (citing People v. Teague, 439 N.E.2d 1066, 1071 (111.App. Ct. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 867 (1983) (No. 82-6981)).
79. See id. (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961. (1983); Swain v. Alabama. 380 U.S.
202, 227 (1965), overruledby Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
80. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
81. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 295 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96).
82. See id. at 294 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1986) (per curiam); Teague
v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 834 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1987)).
83. See id. at 296 (citing Allen, 478 U.S. 255).
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that. although new rules of criminal procedure should be applied to all cases on
direct review, 84 a new rule generally should not be applied to a case which has
already become final-for example, a case on collateral review-at the time the
new rule is created. The Teague Court did carve out two exceptions: The first
exception is where the new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe."' 86 The second exception applies to "watershed rules of criminal
procedure."8 7

111. THE AEDPA's RESTRICTIONS ON SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE MOTIONS FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Between 1986 and 1995, members of Congress introduced more than eighty
bills proposing habeas reform, attempting in particular to impose a statute of
limitations for federal habeas relief.88 None of those bills became law. 8 As has
often been the case, it took a national tragedy to force real change. On June 7,
1995, less than two months after the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and with widespread bipartisan support, the
United States Senate passed the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of
1995, S. 735, the bill that would eventually become the AEDPA. 90 According to
Congress, the purpose of the AEDPA was to "curb the abuse of the statutory writ
of habeas corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and
abuse in capital cases." 91 The House of Representatives passed the final version
of the AEDPA on April 18, 1996, just one day shy of the one-year anniversary of

84. See id at 304 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)).
85. Id. at 310.
86. Id at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States. 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)): see also Katharine A. Ferguson, Note, The Clash of Ring
v. Arizona and Teague v. Lane: An Illustration of the Inapplicability of Modern Habeas
Retroactivity Jurisprudencein the CapitalSentencing Context, 85 B3U. L. REv. 1017, 1031 (2005)
(citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12) (discussing Teague and its exceptions).
87. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Ferguson, supra note 86, at 1031 (citing Teague, 489
U.S. at 311).
88. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 333 (1996) (app.): see also Bellamy. supra note 49, at
10 ("Congress embarked on a campaign for habeas corpus reform
89. Bellamy, supra note 49, at 10 n.70.
90. See S. 735, 104th Cong., 141 CoNG. REc. S7803 (daily ed. June 7. 1995) (enacted). For
a discussion on the history of the bill and the events surrounding its passage, see generally Thomas
C. Martin, Note, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
201, 205-06 (1996) (citations omitted).
91. Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-ofLimitations Bar on the Filing of FederalHabeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2101, 2111
(2002) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at III (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944) (citations omitted).
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Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the bill's sponsors,

went on record stating that the AEDPA was "the only thing [Congress] could do
to prevent even further suffering by [the victims of the Oklahoma City
bombing]." 9

The AEDPA includes two provisions limiting a prisoner's ability to file a
second or successive habeas petition or habeas-like motion.94 The first, 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b), relates to habeas petitions filed by state prisoners under
§ 2254.95 That section requires dismissal of any claim "presented in a second or
successive habeas corpus application under section 225496 that was presented in
a prior application," as well as the dismissal of any such claim "not presented
in a prior application," 98 except in cases where the claim presented is based on "a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable," 99 or in situations where the
facts underlying the claim, even with due diligence, could not have been
discovered earlier, 100 and those facts "would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense."' 0'
Section 2244(b) also makes the court of appeals the gate-keeper by requiring a
habeas petitioner to submit to the court of appeals a motion for leave to file a
second or successive petition in the district court.102 A three-judge panel must
then decide, within thirty days, whether to authorize the district court to consider
such a petition based on whether the applicant "makes a prima facie showing
that the application satisfies the requirements" of § 2244(b). 03 A petitioner may
not appeal the panel's decision. 104
The other provision of the AEDPA that limits the ability of a prisoner to
petition for relief more than once is § 2255(h), which governs motions filed by
prisoners in federal custody. o0 That section requires approval of a second or

92. Id.; see also 142 CONG. REC. 7742, 7804-05 (1996) (Senate vote); 142 CONG. REC.
7937, 7973 (1996) (House vote).
93. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 141 CoNG. REc. 14447, 14525 (1995) (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch)).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006); id. § 2255(h).
95. § 2244(b); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656 (1996) (citing Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220-21 (codified as
anended at § 2244(b))).
96. Section 2254 deals specifically with the remedies that state prisoners may seek in federal
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
97. Id. § 2244(b)(1).
98. § 2244(b)(2).
99. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
100. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
101. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
102. See § 2244(b)(3)(A).
103. § 2244(b)(3)(B)-(D).
104. See § 2244(b)(3)(E).
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2011). Although a motion under § 2255 is often referred to as a
"habeas petition," this is not technically correct. See § 2255(a). Section 2255 deals with motions to
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successive motion by the procedures set forth in § 2244 and, like the previous
provision, allows for such a motion only where there is "newly discovered
evidence that ... would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the
offense,"' o or where the Supreme Court makes "a new rule of constitutional
law" retroactively applicable and that new rule was not previously available.10As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, the changes made by
the AEDPA in §§ 2254 (dealing with state prisoners) and 2255 (dealing with
federal prisoners) "are materially identical in both types of cases, the evolution
of the remedy and restrictions on it are materially identical, and the relationship
of the AEDPA changes to that evolution are materially identical."108 There is
one major difference, however, between these two sections-§ 2255 contains a
savings clause, and § 2254 does not.109 The savings clause of § 2255 provides
that a prisoner whose motion for relief made under § 2255 has been denied may
subsequently apply for habeas relief if the remedy § 2255 provides "is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 0 The Eleventh
Circuit offered a clear explanation of the interplay between § 2255's ban on
successive motions and a prisoner's ability to petition for habeas relief pursuant
to the savings clause:
Typically, collateral attacks on the validity of a federal conviction
or sentence must be brought tinder [28 U.S.C.] § 2255. When a prisoner
has previously filed a § 2255 motion to vacate, he must apply for and
receive permission from the court of appeals before filing a successive
§ 2255 motion. [The savings clause] of § 2255, however, permits a
federal prisoner, tinder very limited circumstances, to file a habeas
petition pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.'
Although the structure of, and the language used in, the AEDPA tend to be
somewhat confusing, its effect on multiple attempts at collateral relief is clear: a
prisoner in state custody may apply for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 to

vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence. Id.; see also United States v. Brierton, No. 98-10382, slip.
op. at 3 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999) (noting that § 2255 does not deal with habeas petitions, but instead
deals with motions). However, the rights granted under § 2255 are the same as those granted by the
habeas statute-the purpose of § 2255 was "to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas
corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum." United States
v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952) (citing John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse ofJHabeas Copus,
8 F.R.D. 171, 175 (1949)).
106. § 2255(h)(1).
107. § 2255(h)(2).
108. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
109. See id. (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).
110. § 2255(e).
11. Hill v. Warden, 364 F. App'x, 587, 588 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (2006); § 2255(h); Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1365 (l th Cir. 2003)).
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challenge his custody on federal constitutional or statutory grounds.112 However,
a court will not entertain a second or successive petition brought under § 2254 if
the claim was presented in a prior habeas petition or, even if it was not so
presented, unless the petitioner meets the specific requirements of § 2244(b),
discussed above.11 A federal prisoner may challenge his sentence by filing a
motion under § 2255. 14 After a federal prisoner moves once under § 2255, he
must seek leave to file a second motion by the same procedures set forth in
§ 2244.1 A prisoner authorized to a file a § 2255 motion may not normally
apply for a writ of habeas corpus except where the mechanism provided under
§ 2255 proves to be "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention." 1 6
IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

The Case ofEzell Gilbert

Congress's attempt at providing a comprehensive post-collateral-relief
framework that would minimize delay and abuse yielded a perhaps unintended
consequence-the possibility that a prisoner with a valid claim that his sentence
was incorrect or invalid, based on intervening changes in the law, might be left
with no remedy.117 That scenario arose in the case of federal prisoner Ezell
Gilbert.'"
Gilbert pleaded guilty in federal court to possession of crack cocaine with
intent to distribute and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.119 At
sentencing, the government waived its right to argue for a mandatory life
sentence pursuant to a federal statute which would have required such a sentence
based on Gilbert's prior drug convictions.120 Gilbert was sentenced as a career
offender based on two prior convictions-one for possession of cocaine with
intent to sell ("a controlled substance offense"), and the other for carrying a
concealed weapon (a "crime of violence").121 Based on the career offender
enhancement, Gilbert's sentencing guideline range was between 292 and 365
months.122 Without that enhancement, his range would have been between 151

112. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2011).
113. Id. 2244(b); see also supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (walking through the
specific requirements).
114. Id 2255(a).
115. §2255(h).
116. § 2255(e).
117. See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
118. See id. at 1324.

119. Id at 1298.
120. Id
121. Id at 1299 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
122. Id at 1300.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

382

[VOL. 64: 369

and 188 months.123 The district court rejected Gilbert's argument that carrying a
concealed weapon was not a crime of violence, sentencing Gilbert to 292
months. 124 The district court judge made it clear that he disagreed with the
severity of the sentence, but he lacked the discretion to downwardly depart:
The fact that I think the sentence is too high is immaterial. . .. I
don't see any authority under the law for me to downwardly depart. So,
counsel, I have given you reversible error if you can convince the
Eleventh Circuit that I'm wrong.
If I'm wrong, they will correct it. Because if I could do it legally, I
would. I don't think I can.125
Gilbert appealed his sentence to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that carrying a
concealed weapon was not a crime of violence for sentencing purposes.
The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed Gilbert's sentence.127 The
Supreme Court denied Gilbert's petition for certiorari.12 8 One year later, Gilbert
filed a § 2255 motion but failed to reiterate his crime of violence argument.1
The district court denied this motion, and the Eleventh Circuit declined to issue a
certificate of appealability.1 31
In 2008, after the United States Sentencing Commission published
Amendment 706, providing for a two-level reduction in base offense levels for
crack cocaine offenses, the district court sua sponte ordered a hearing to
determine whether Gilbert was entitled to a reduced sentence under the
Amendment.131 Subsequent to the hearing, the district court concluded that
Gilbert was not entitled to such a sentence reduction because he was sentenced
tinder the career offender guideline, and not the crack cocaine guideline. 132
After the district court issued its order denying a sentence reduction, Gilbert
filed a "Motion to Reopen and Amend First 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion."133 In
this motion, Gilbert again raised the argument that had been rejected by both the
district court as well as the Eleventh Circuit on direct appeal-that his career

123. Id
124. Id
125. Gilbert v. United States, 609 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, 640 F.3d
1293.
126. 640 F.3d at 1300.
127. See id. (quoting United States v. Gilbert. 138 F.3d 1371, 1371 (1 Ith Cir. 1998),
abrogatedbyUnited States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (1Ith Cir. 2008)).
128. Id at 1300-01 (citing Gilbert v. United States, 526 U.S. 1111, 1111 (1999)).
129. See id at 1301.

130. Id.
131. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C amend. 706 (2007)).
132. Id (quoting Order at 5, United States v. Gilbert, No. 8:95-CR-311-T-30TGW (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 21, 2009)).
133. Id. (quoting Gilbert v. United States, 609 F.3d 1159, 1162 (11th Cir. 2010), rev'd en
banc, 640 F.3d 1293) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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offender status had been in error because carrying a concealed weapon was not a
crime of violence. 134 This time, however, Gilbert had the law on his side. In
2008, after his appeals were exhausted and arguments rejected, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Begay v. United States,135 in which it held that
driving tinder the influence was not a violent felony for purposes of a sentencing
enhancement provision. 1 Based on Begav, the Eleventh Circuit held, in United
States v. Archer,13 "that carrying a concealed firearm was not a 'crime of
violence' . . . for purposes of the § 411.1 career offender enhancement,'" 38
thereby overruling its own decision in Gilbert v. United States(39 and adopting
the argument that Gilbert raised in both the district court and court of appeals.
If Gilbert celebrated what, at first glance, appeared to be an epic victoryone that would result in a major reduction in his sentence and bring his release to
within sight
h41-is
celebration was short-lived. The district court rejected
Gilbert's renewed motion, holding that the AEDPA's ban on second or
successive petitions barred Gilbert from seeking relief.142 Gilbert attempted to
get around this roadblock in one of two ways: First, he argued that the district
court could treat his motion as a motion to reopen and revisit its original order
tinder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 1 Alternatively, Gilbert argued
that his motion could be treated as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 144
by using the savings clause of § 2255(e).145
As to the former argument, the district court held that Gilbert could not take
advantage of Rule 60(b) under existing precedent forbidding the use of that rule
to bring a § 2254 claim otherwise barred by AEDPA's ban on second or

134. See id.

135. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
136. Gilbert. 640 F.3d at 1301 (citing Begay, 553 U.S. at 148).
137. 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008).
138. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1301 (citing Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352).
139. 609 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2010). rev den banc, 640 F.3d 1293.
140. See Gilbert.640 F.3d at 1301-02.
141. As the dissent notes, had Gilbert's sentence been properly calculated without the career
offender enhancement, his maximum sentence would have been approximately thirteen years. Id. at
1330 (Martin, J., dissenting). By the time the Eleventh Circuit's en banc opinion was issued,
Gilbert had served more than fourteen years in federal prison. Id.
142. Id. at 1302 (majority opinion) (citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-32 (2005)).
143. Id.
144. Section 2241 permits federal judges to grant writs of habeas corpus under certain
circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2011).
145. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1302 (citing Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1237, 1245 (1 Ith Cir.
1999)); see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (explaining the savings clause and its
role in a prisoner's petition for habeas relief). The "savings clause" of § 2255(e) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized
to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears
that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
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successive petitions.14 The court also rejected Gilbert's latter argument, holding
that his claim did not meet the requirements of § 2255(e)'s savings clause.147 On
appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that
Gilbert could file a habeas petition by way of the savings clause of§ 2255(e). 1 8
The Eleventh Circuit then granted a rehearing en bane and reversed the panel
decision. 1 9
The en banc court began its decision by taking issue with the presumption
that Gilbert's sentence would have been lighter had he been sentenced postBegay and Archer. 0 The faulty logic behind this presumption, according to the
majority of the en banc court, was that it required one to assume that, had Begay
and Archer been decided prior to Gilbert's sentencing, the government would
have waived its statutory right to a mandatory life sentence.
The court
reasoned that, had the government known that Gilbert was facing a sentence of
151 to 188 months, as opposed to the enhanced 292 to 365 months, it likely
would not have waived its right to seek a mandatory life sentence.152 "It is one
thing not to insist on a life sentence when the defendant is facing at least 292
months without the enhancement," the court held, "and quite another to forgo it
if he might be sentenced to less than half that much time."153 However, despite
the reasons not to do so, the majority began with the assumption that, had Begay
and Archer been decided prior to Gilbert's sentencing, he would have received a
154
"substantially lighter sentence than . . . he did.
Next, the majority took issue with another assumption that it characterized
as faulty-that Gilbert would receive a shorter sentence if he were granted a new
sentencing hearing.155 The court noted that, if Gilbert were resentenced, the
sentencing judge could consider certain statutory factors not considered in the
first sentencing hearing to upwardly depart from the advisory sentencing
guideline range, which could include Gilbert's criminal history, his prior
probation violations, and the fact that during the crime for which he was
sentenced in this case, he allegedly took his five-year-old daughter along to
watch him sell drugs.
Again, however, the court accepted the assumption that

146. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1302 (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530-32).
147. Id.
148. Id (citing Gilbert v. United States. 609 F.3d 1159. 116548 (11th Cir. 2010). rev'd en
banc, 640 F.3d 1293 (1 Ith Cir. 2011)).
149. Id. (citing Gilbert v. United States, 625 F.3d 716, 716 (11 th Cir. 2010)).
150. See id
151. See id. at 1303; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing how, at
sentencing, the government waived its statutory right to a mandatory life sentence).
152. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1303.
153. Id
154. Id at 1304.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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Gilbert's sentence would be substantially lower if he were granted a new
hearing.157
The court then addressed the main issue of whether, pursuant to the savings
clause of § 2255(e), Gilbert was permitted to file a § 2241 habeas petition after
having filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion.158 Starting with the text of the
statute, the court noted that the savings clause does not expressly authorize the
filing of a § 2241 habeas petition to remedy a sentence miscalculation that may
no longer be raised in a § 2255 motion.159 Instead, the court held that the savings
clause only allows the filing of a § 2241 petition when "the remedy [by § 2255]
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the petitioner's]
detention."160 The court concluded that the reason Gilbert could not obtain relief
through a § 2255 motion-the AEDPA's bar on second or successive motions"cannot mean that § 2255 is 'inadequate or ineffective' to test the legality of
Gilbert's detention within the meaning of the savings clause."161 "If it did," the
court reasoned, "the savings clause would eviscerate the second or successive
motions bar, and prisoners could file an endless stream of § 2255 motions, none
of which could be dismissed without a determination of the merits of the claims
they raise."1 62 The court declined to adopt an interpretation that it claimed
would render the AEDPA's bar on second or successive motions "pointless."l63
Next, the court discussed the finality interests involved in the case, holding
that "[t]he critically important nature of the finality interests safeguarded by
§ 2255(h) also weighs heavily against an interpretation of the savings clause that
would lower the second or successive motions bar and permit guidelines-based
attacks years after the denial of an initial § 2255 motion."1 64 The court noted the
frequency in which the law interpreting sentencing guidelines-such as the
meaning of crime of violence and whether a particular crime falls within this
category-evolves, and reasoned that allowing a prisoner to use the savings
clause to evade the bar on second or successive motions would result in
"finality-busting effects."165 The court listed several examples of sentencing
enhancements that might be open for judicial interpretation in the futureincluding "physical contact," "bodily injury," and "reckless conduct"-and
opined that the rule Gilbert was advancing would apply each time the definition

157. Id. at 1305.
158. See id. at 1305-06.
159. Id at 1307.
160. Id (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
161. Id. at 1307-08.
162. Id. at 1308.
163. See id
164. Id. at 1309.
165. See id.
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of such a term evolved.166 Predicting a doomsday scenario under Gilbert's
proposed interpretation of the savings clause, the majority continued:
As a result, no federal judgment imposing a sentence would be truly
final until the sentence was completely served or the prisoner had gone
on to face a different kind of final j udgment. The exception that Gilbert
would have us write into § 2255(h) using the savings clause as our pen
would wreak havoc on the finality interests that Congress worked so
hard to protect with the AEDPA provisions.1
Because one of the main goals of the AEDPA was to promote finality for
convictions,168 and because the bar against second or successive motions is one
of the AEDPA's main mechanisms for ensuring such finality, 169 the majority
concluded that it could not adopt Gilbert's interpretation of the savings clause.n17
The court then reviewed decisions from its sister circuits on the issue, and
concluded that every circuit that had decided the issue before it had reached the
same conclusion-that "the savings clause of § 2255(e) does not permit a
prisoner to bring in a § 2241 petition a guidelines miscalculation claim that is
barred from being presented in a § 2255 motion by the second or successive
motions bar of § 2255(h)."171
Next, the majority rejected the dissent's position that the court's refusal to
apply the savings clause in Gilbert's case resulted in a violation of the
Suspension Clause of Article 1, Section 9.172 In support of this holding, the
majority cited Felker v. Turpin, in which the Supreme Court held that, in the
context of a § 2254 petition, the AEDPA's bar on second or successive petitions
did not violate the Suspension Clause.174 The court in Gilbert reasoned that,
although Felker dealt specifically with § 2254, the issue of whether there was a
violation of the Suspension Clause was the same in the context of § 2255
because "[t]he changes made by the AEDPA restrictions on second or successive
filings are materially identical in both types of cases, the evolution of the remedy
and restrictions on it are materially identical, and the relationship of the AEDPA
changes to that evolution are materially identical."1
The majority then

166. See id. at 1309-10 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Al.4(a)(2)(A),
2A2.2(b)(3), 2A2.4(b)(1)(A) (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id at 1310.
168. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2003)).
169. Id. at 1311.
170. See id at 1312.
171. Id For the cases the court cites in its opinion, see Okereke v. United States. 307 F.3d
117 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2001); Kinder v. Purdy, 222
F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000).
172. Gilbert. 640 F.3d at 1316.

173. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
174. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1317 (citing Felker, 518 U.S. at 663-64).

175. Id.
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dismissed the dissent's argument that the savings clause of § 2255(e) is what
According to the
prevented § 2255 from violating the Suspension Clause.
majority, this argument could not stand in light of Felker, which upheld the
constitutionality of§ 2254 despite its lack of a savings clause.
The Gilbert majority then rejected the argument that Gilbert's case fell under
an actual innocence exception.
First, the court discussed the actual innocence
exception contained in § 2255(h), which it described as "a narrow one."17 The
court noted that the statutory actual innocence exception "applies only when the
claim is based on 'newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant
guilty of the offense."'ISO Because Gilbert's claim was not based on newly
discovered evidence, a fact that Gilbert admitted was true, the majority
concluded that the statutory actual innocence exception contained in § 2255(h)
did not apply. 81
Next, the majority discussed another actual innocence exception recognized
by certain courts-referred to as the "Bailey actual innocence exception," after
the Supreme Court's opinion in Bailey v. United States1 82-defining the term
"use" as applied to possession of a firearm during a drug crime in a narrow
fashion.18 3 The court in Gilbert explained that the Bailey exception is used to
allow, pursuant to the savings clause, "a claim of actual innocence of the crime
of conviction to be brought in a § 2241 petition when it cannot be brought in a
second or successive motion because of § 2255(h)."14 The court noted that the
Bailey exception is broader than the statutory exception contained in
§ 2255(h)(1) "because it encompasses innocence based on changes in the law
where the evidence remains the same." 1 However, the court went on to hold
that Bailey claims could succeed only where "a retroactively applicable, circuit
law-busting decision of the Supreme Court established that [the petitioner] had
been convicted of a nonexistent crime."1 86 The court in Gilbert concluded that
because the crime for which Gilbert was convicted was not rendered nonexistent,
he could not bring a Bailey claim.187

176. See id (quoting id at 1329 (Barkett, J., dissenting)).
177. Id (citing Felker, 518 U.S. at 663-63).
178. See id. at 1318.

179. Id.
180. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (2006)).
181. See id.
182. 516 U.S. 137 (1995), superseded bv statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386,
112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010).
183. See Gilbert. 640 F.3d at 1318-19 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994); Bailey, 516 U.S. at
150).
184. Id. at 1318.
185. Id
186. Id at 1319 (citing Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 1244 (11th Cir. 1999)).
187. See id. at 1319 20. The majority rejected Gilbert's contention that the exception applied
because he was "actually innocent of being a career offender." Id. at 1320 (quoting En Banc Brief
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The Eleventh Circuit also discussed the "actual innocence of sentence
exception" laid out in Sawyer v. Whitley. 8 The court noted that Sawryer did not
involve the savings clause of § 2255(e) or sentencing guideline errors, but
instead dealt with "a second or successive motion claiming constitutional error in
a jury's determination that the petitioner should be sentenced to death" prior to
the enactment of the AEDPA.
The Gilbert majority explained that, prior to
the AEDPA, petitioners were not allowed to raise claims in second or successive
petitions "unless the petitioner could show cause and prejudice or could establish
a miscarriage of justice."190 In turn, the court explained, the "miscarriage of
justice exception required a showing of actual (factual) innocence."19
In
Sawryer, then, according to the Gilbert majority, the Supreme Court held that the
actual innocence exception at issue in that case applied "to constitutional errors
in capital sentencing only when the constitutional error resulted in the petitioner
becoming statutorily
eligible for a death sentence that could not otherwise have
1 92
been imposed."
The court in Gilbert discussed four reasons why the Sawyer actual innocence
exception was inapplicable to the case before it.
First, Gilbert's case was not a
capital punishment case. 194 Second, the court held that the Sawryer exception
operated only where a constitutional error was alleged, not where the error
claimed was a statutory or guidelines error.'
Third, the court held that Gilbert
would not be able to take advantage of the Sawyer exception even without these
first two limitations because, according to the court, he failed to satisfy the
requirement of showing that "but for the claimed error he would not have been
statutorily eligible for the sentence he received."' 96 The fourth and final reason
the Gilbert majority gave as to why Gilbert could not take advantage of the
Sawyer actual innocence exception was that actual innocence exceptions carved
out prior to the AEDPA's enactment do not apply to guidelines errors post-

AEDPA. 19 7
Finally, the Gilbert majority addressed, and rejected, Gilbert's argument that
his motion should have been treated as a motion for relief under Federal Rule of

of Appellant Gilbert at 43, Gilbert, 640 F.3d 1293 (No. 09-12513-CC)). The court reasoned that.
despite his contention, Gilbert was not convicted of being a career offender and, therefore, could not
say that he was convicted of a nonexistent crime. Id. The court stated that this position "turns on
treating sentences as convictions, and ain argument that depends on calling a duck a donkey is not
much of an argument." Id
188. Id. at 1320 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992)).
189. Id. (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 335).
190. Id (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 338-39).
191. Id (alteration in original) (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339).
192. Id. (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 348 50).
193. Id.
194. See id at 1320-21 (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 340-41).
195. Id at 1321.
196. Id. at 1322.
197. Id. (citing Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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Civil Procedure 60(b). 198 The court in Gilbert cited Gonzalez v. Crosby,199
where the Supreme Court held that "state prisoners could not use Rule 60(b) to
evade the second or successive petition bar contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) by
either adding a new ground for relief or attacking the federal court's previous
rejection of a claim on the merits."200 Although the Supreme Court in Gonzalez
explicitly limited its holding to state prisoner cases,20 the court in Gilbert joined
"every other circuit that ha[d] addressed the issue" and concluded that the rule in
Gonzalez applied with equal force to federal prisoner cases.202
The majority in Gilbert concluded by holding that "the savings clause does
not authorize a federal prisoner to bring in a § 2241 petition a claim, which
would otherwise be barred by § 2255(h), that the sentencing guidelines were
misapplied in a way that resulted in a longer sentence not exceeding the statutory
maximum.,203 In the name of finalitZ of judgment, the majority held that Gilbert
was stuck with his original sentence. 04
In a strongly worded dissent joined by two other judges, Judge Beverly
Martin expressed her opinion that the savings clause of § 2255(e) provided
Gilbert with a remedy under the extraordinary circumstances of his case.2
f
Gilbert is not entitled to relief under the savings clause, according to the dissent,
then he "has been subjected to a deprivation of liberty of such magnitude that,
when paired with no possible remedy, we are confronted with a constitutional
question that we otherwise need not have reached."206 That question, Judge
Martin wrote, is whether the AEDPA, as interpreted by the ma ority of the court,
violates the Suspension Clause of Article I of the Constitution.
The dissent began its discussion by noting the avenues of relief that were not
available to Gilbert.208 First, the dissent noted that Gilbert was not able to raise
his crime of violence argument in his first § 2255 petition because of Circuit
precedent prohibiting the relitigation of issues already decided on direct
appeal.209 Next, the dissent continued, Gilbert could not avail himself of
§ 2255(h) because that section allows for second or successive motions only

198. See id. at 1323 (citing FED. R. Cl. P. 60(b)(5)-(6); Gonzalez v. Crosby 545 U.S. 524,
532 (2005)). Specifically, Gilbert cited Rule 60(b)(5), which allows relief from a final judgment or
order where "the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable" and
Rule 60(b)(6), which allows such relief for "any other reason that justifies relief." FED. R. Cl. P.
60(b)(5)-(6).

199. 545 U.S. 524 (2005).
200. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1323 (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532).
201. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 538.
202. Gilbert. 640 F.3d at 1323.

203. Id
204. Id. at 1324.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 1330 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id at 1330-31.
Id at 1331 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2).
Id.
See id. (citing United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (1 lth Cir. 2000)).
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where there is newly discovered evidence or a retroactively applied new rule of
constitutional law.2ro -This means that Mr. Gilbert, who was never a career
offender in light of Begav's retroactive application, has no remedy under
§ 2255(h) even though he will be incarcerated for just short of a uarter century
based on a mistaken determination that he was a career offender." 21
The dissent then discussed the savings clause of § 2255(e):
Mr. Gilbert did not fail to apply for relief, but rather has diligently
pursued every legal avenue available to him, including, of course, direct
appeal to this Court. Since Mr. Gilbert still faces a sentence of more
than 24 years despite our admission that we decided his case wrongly,
his efforts can only be said to have been of no effect. Therefore,
proceeding tinder the plain terms of the statute, as we must, § 2255 has
been both inadequate and ineffective for Mr. Gilbert. Under the statute,
therefore, Mr. Gilbert may turn to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.212
In support of the argument that Gilbert was entitled to relief tinder the
savings clause, the dissent cited Wofford v. Scott, 1 where over ten years prior,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that sentencing claims "based upon a retroactively
applicable Supreme Court decision overturning circuit precedent" were the only
claims that "may conceivably be covered" by the savings clause.214 The dissent
in Gilbert noted that, in the case before it, the government did not dispute that
the Supreme Court's decision in Begay-which led to the Eleventh Circuit's
holding that carrying a concealed firearm was not a crime of violence for
purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement-was a "retroactively
applicable Supreme Court decision overturning circuit precedent."215 According
to the dissenters, the Gilbert majority opinion foreclosed the possibility left open
in Wofford, and "remove[d] any possibility of habeas relief for Mr. Gilbert by
equating the requirements for relief tinder § 2255(e) with those under § 2255(h)
and, in the process, render[ing] the savings clause a dead letter." 2 16 The dissent
continued:
So now it is true that there is no relief in Alabama, Florida or Georgia
for any person who is, for some reason, barred from relief tinder § 2255
but wrongfully incarcerated on account of a sentencing error. This is so,

210. Id (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006)).
211. Id
212. Id. at 1332 (citation omitted).

213. 177 F.3d 1236 (1lth Cir. 1999).
214. Gilbert. 640 F.3d at 1332 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Wofjbrd, 177 F.3d at 1245)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Id. (quoting Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1245) (internal quotation marks omitted).

216. Id.
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even here, where that sentencing error leaves him incarcerated for a
decade or more beyond what is called for by law.217
Next, the dissent discussed the constitutional concerns that arose when a
prisoner was forced to satisfy the requirements of § 2255(h) in order to take
advantage of the savings clause of § 2255(e).218 Briefly reviewing the history
and importance of the writ, the dissent cited United States v. Hayman,219 a case
from a half-century prior, in which the Supreme Court recognized the role of
§ 2241 in cases where the § 2255 procedure was rendered "inadequate or
ineffective."220 The Gilbert dissent acknowledged that Hayman was decided
years before the AEDPA amendments to § 2255, but went on to opine that
neither those amendments, nor any other developments since Hayman, "were
intended to remove the power and responsibility of the judiciary to enforce
§ 2241 ." In a strong, if not dramatic, passage, the dissent stated:
Our duty to interpret [§ 2241] according to its plain terms is especially
robust in light of the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. By
today's decision we have shirked our duty in that regard, and in doing so
we diminish the institution of the federal courts.
As if to highlight the harm we do to the court, during oral argument
the government stated that the only possible avenue of recourse for Mr.
Gilbert is to seek clemency from the Executive Branch of government.
Surely we neglect our responsibility when we turn away a wrongfully
incarcerated defendant with the suggestion that he seek relief from the
branch already charged with the vast responsibility of exercising
executive powers. The responsibility for assuring individual justice is
222
ours.
The dissent then rebutted several of the majority's points.
First, according
to the dissent, the majority's holding that the savings clause of § 2255(e) does
not apply unless the requirements of § 2255(h) are satisfied violated the canon of
statutory construction disfavoring the repeal of a statute by implication.
The
majority's holding, the dissent opined, "flies in the face of Congress's deliberate
choice to leave the savings clause intact when passing AEDPA." 225 The dissent
also responded to the majority's discussion of the importance of finality:

217. Id
218. Id at 1333.
219. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
220. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1333 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Hayman, 342 U.S. at 223)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

221. Id
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
See id at 1333-36 (citations omitted).
Id at 1333 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1974)).
Id at 1334.
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Surely Mr. Gilbert's case is a poor vehicle to promote the idea that
finality builds confidence in our criminal justice system. Today we tell
a man he must sit in the penitentiary for years beyond the sentence that a
proper application of the law would have imposed, when we rejected his
correct interpretation of what the law meant back in 1998.226
The dissent stated that none of the main principles promoted by finalityincluding confidence in the integrity of the judicial system, minimization of costs
and delay, avoidance of spoliation of evidence, and comity-were advanced by
denying Gilbert relief.
As to building confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system, the dissent noted that this principle was not advanced because, to
the world, it would appear as though the court was "refusing to acknowledge or
make amends for its own mistake." 8 With regard to costs and delay, the dissent
stated that these things had already been incurred and that granting Gilbert relief
would actually eliminate the expenses of his incarceration.229 Finally, the last
two principles were not affected as there was no evidence that might be spoiled,
and there were no comity concerns as Gilbert's sentence was imposed by a
federal, and not a state, court.230
The dissent rebutted the majority's contention that every other circuit had
agreed with its conclusion.23 It cited Triestman v. United States,n2 where the
Second Circuit held that the phrase "inadequate or ineffective," as used in
§ 2255(e), referred, at a minimum, to "the set of cases in which the petitioner
cannot, for whatever reason, utilize § 2255, and in which the failure to allow for
collateral review would raise serious constitutional questions." 2 According to
the dissent, this language from the Second Circuit did not foreclose relief to
Gilbert. 234 "Surely it must be true," the dissent reasoned, "that keeping someone
in the penitentiary for such a substantial duration beyond what the
correct
2
sentence would call for constitutes a 'serious constitutional question."' 35
The dissent also cited In re Davenport,236 which the Gilbert majority
interpreted as rejecting the argument that a § 2241 claim can be raised when a
second or successive motion is barred by § 2255.7 The dissent in Gilbert
agreed with this interpretation of Davenport but noted that the Davenport court

226. 1d
227. Id
228. Id
229. Id

230. Id
231. Id at 1335 (quoting id at 1308 (majority opinion)).
232. 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997).
233. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1335 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Id
235. Id
236. Id (citing In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998)).
237. Id. at 1308 (majority opinion) (citing In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 608).
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"concluded that ' a] federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus
only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a
fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after
his first 2255 motion." '
The Gilbert dissent reasoned that because Gilbert
"has never had a 'reasonable opportunity' to obtain a judicial correction of such
a fundamental defect, it may well be that he would prevail in the Seventh
Circuit."2 The dissent criticized what it saw as the majority's over-reliance on

decisions from other circuits, noting that while decisions from other circuits
might be helpful to consider, the ultimate decision as to Gilbert's fate was left in
their hands only. 240
Lastly, the dissent downplayed the majority's concern that granting relief to
Gilbert would open the floodgates of litigation:
Indeed if there are others who are wrongfully detained without a
remedy, we should devote the time and incur the expense to hear their
cases. What is the role of the courts, if not this? But what is important
today is the consequence to Mr. Gilbert of our unwillingness to correct
241
our past legal error.
A separate dissent, written by Judge James C. Hill, referred to the majority's
holding as the "'Catch-22' approach to sentencing claims."m In response to the
majority's focus on the interest of finality, Judge Hill opined that "[a] judicial
system that values finality over justice is morally bankrupt."243 Judge Hill
continued, "Surely, the Great Writ cannot be so moribund, so shackled by the
procedural requirements of rigid gatekeeping, that it does not afford review of

Gilbert's claim."244 In a.passage for which the label "stern" would be an extreme
understatement, Judge Hill summed tip his view of the majority's holding:
Today, this court holds that we may not remedy such a sentencing
error. This shocking result-urged by a department of the United States
that calls itself, without a trace of irony, the Department of Justice-and
accepted by a court that emasculates itself by adopting such a rule of
judicial impotency-confirms what I have long feared. The Great Writ
is dead in this country.245

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id at 1335 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611).
Id at 1335-36.
See id. at 1336.
Id.
Id (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id at 1337.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
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Other PotentialConstitutionalConcerns

Apart from the concern expressed by the Gilbert dissenters that denying a
petitioner in Gilbert's position any relief may violate the Suspension Clause of

Article 1,246 other courts have at least su ested that such a denial may also
amount to a deprivation of Due Process.
In Narvaez v. United States.2
decided just one month after the en banc decision in Gilbert, the Seventh Circuit
was faced with a situation similar to the one presented in Gilbert.2
The
petitioner in -Narvaez pleaded guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced as a
career offender based on two prior escape convictions.25o Narvaez filed a § 2255
motion, in which he argued, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decisions in Begay
v. United States251 and Chambers v. United States,252 that he was not a career
offender.253 The district court denied Narvaez any relief, concluding that Begay
and Chambers did not apply retroactively on collateral review. 25 Unlike in
Gilbert, the petitioner in Narvaez raised his career offender argument in his first
§ 2255 motion; therefore, the Seventh Circuit did not have to address the
AEDPA's ban on second or successive motions. 2 On appeal, Narvaez argued,
among other things, that his increased term of imprisonment based on his
incorrect designation as a career offender amounted to a deprivation of Due
Process.256 In an opinion reversing the district court's denial of relief, the
Seventh Circuit, though not deciding Narvaez's Due Process claim, , noted that
Narvaez had a "constitutional right to be deprived of libert ' as punishment for
criminal conduct only to the extent authorized by Congress."

246. See id at 1329-30 (Barkett, J., dissenting); id. at 1333 (Martin, J., dissenting).
247. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2011) (en banc); cf In re
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998) ("I]t is an open question whether a right to a
meaningful opportunity to correct judicial errors by means of appellate or collateral attacks on a
criminal judgment is conferred by the due process clause as that clause is understood today.").
248. 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
249. See id. at 623 25 (citations omitted).
250. Id. at 623.
251. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
252. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
253. Navraez, 674 F.3d at 625 (citing Chambers, 555 U.S. 122, Begay, 553 U.S. 137).
254. Id
255. See id at 627 n1.10, 630 n.14 (citing Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293. 1306 (11th
Cir. 2011) (en banc)) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit did not have to address the issue of ain "initial
collateral attack").
256. See id at 627 n1.10.
257. See id at 630.
258. Id. at 627 (quoting Whalen v. United States. 445 U.S. 684, 690 (1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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C. Avoiding the Constitutional and Administrative Concerns: 4 MiddleGround 4pproach
The strongly worded opinions in Gilbert make it clear that major
constitutional and administrative concerns arise on both sides of the debate. On
the one hand, as the majority of the en banc court suggested2. the AEDPA's
restrictions on second or successive motions reflect Congress's acknowledgment
that allowing prisoners-who often have an abundant amount of time to
research, draft, and file petitions for post-conviction relief-to file numerous and
often repetitive post-conviction relief motions can lead to "'the abuse of the
statutory writ of habeas corpus,""260 and may 26result
in "'the acute problems of
1
unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases."'
The available statistics support Congress's concerns, as well as the concerns
the majority in Gilbert raised, related to the problems of delay and abuse of postconviction relief procedures.262 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS), a component of the Department of Justice, between 1985 and 1999. the
number of habeas petitions and § 2255 motions increased from 4,932 per year to
9,342.
The rate at which inmates filed these petitions and motions, however,
remained relatively unchanged during this same time period.264 Interestingly,
according to a 2002 BJS report, the number of habeas petitions and § 2255
motions actually increased in the four years after Congress passed the
AEDPA. 265 The 2002 BJS Report shows that the number of habeas petitions and
§ 2255 motions increased from 20,958 in 1995 to 31,556 in 2000.
The filing
rate also increased, from nineteen to twenty-three per 1,000 inmates during that
time frame.267 In 2000, for every 1,000 federal prison inmates, forty-four § 2255
motions and twenty-seven habeas petitions were filed.268 According to a 2001

259. See Gilbert.640 F.3d at 1309-12 (citations omitted).
260. Zheng, supra note 91, at 2111 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at III (1996) (Conf.
Rep.), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944).
261. Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 111).
262. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1309-12 (citations omitted); Zheng, supra note 91, at 2111
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111); see also JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS. 1999 WITH TRENDS 198599, at 5 (Ser. No. NCJ 185055. 2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS], availableat http:/
/bjs.ojp.usdqj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf (showing an increase in the number of habeas corpus
and motions to vacate a sentence from 1985-1999); JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS.
2000, WlTH TRENDS 1980 2000, at I (Ser. No. NCJ 189430, 2002) [hereinafter PRISONER
PETITIONS], available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdfppfusdO0.pdf (explaining how enactment of
the AEDPA caused an increase in the rate of habeas corpus petitions filed).
263. FEDERAL CRIMIN-AL APPEALS, supra note 262, at 5.
264. Id According to the report, 65% of habeas petitions and § 2255 motions filed in 1995
were dismissed. Id
265. PRISONER PETITIONS, supra note 262, at 1.
266. Id
267. Id
268. Id at 2-3.
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report issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, both
habeas petitions and motions under §§ 2254 and 2255 "reached peak levels in
1997 before stabilizing" between 1997 and 2001.269 That report also found that,
despite the additional filing requirements that the AEDPA imposed on state
prisoners, habeas petitions rose 50% between 1996 and 2001.

The report went

on to opine that "[a]s a result, prisoners appear to have shifted from using
[§ 2254] (specifically addressed in the AEDPA) to using [§ 2241] to challenge
their imprisonment. Many of these petitions have been dismissed as frivolous or
unfounded."
The majority in Gilbert stated that finality interests, protected by § 2255(h),
"weigh[] heavily against an interpretation of the savings clause that would lower
the second or successive motions bar and permit guidelines-based attacks years
after the denial of an initial § 2255 motion."
This notion was the very impetus
behind Chief Justice Rehnquist forming the Powell Committee in 1988. 2- The
Gilbert majority theorized that "the finality-busting effects of permitting
prisoners to use the savings clause as a means of evading the second or
successive motions bar" would not be limited to situations where subsequent
developments rendered a career offender enhancement erroneous but would also
apply "to every type and kind of enhancement, of which there are scores in the

269. STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD:

RECENT TRENDS 11 (2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicial
CaseloadStati stics/'2001/20015yr.pdf.
270. Id
271. Id
272. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
273. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Several authors have criticized how courts
have dealt with finality when applying the AEDPA. Lee Kovarsky, for example, argues that
"AEDPA jurisprudence has improperly abstracted comity. finality, and federalism to a level of
generality that transforms those interests into a generalized presumption in favor of government
respondents." Kovarsky, supra note 16, at 453. Kovarsky goes on to state: "Finality can
compromise justice, so a desired state of finality implies a normative judgment about acceptable
uncertainty. For the same reason that criminal procedure cannot eliminate all uncertainty, our
habeas law cannot logically be organized around any numeric concept of 'correctness.'" Id. at 454;
see also Karen M. Marshall, Note, Finding Time for Federal Habeas Corpus: Carey v. Saffold, 37
AK'RON L. REv. 549, 576-77 (2004) (quoting DUKER, supra note 20, 3 (1980)) (criticizing the
AEDPA's one-year statute of limitation, and arguing that the statute "forces the federal courts to
choose the value of finality over any constitutional obligations," and that "[i]f federal habeas is to
continue to have a role as the 'great writ of liberty' despite the AEDPA system, the Supreme Court
must move away from formalities and back towards fairness."). Other scholars have written in
support of the importance of finality in criminal jurisprudence. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 447 (1963)
("Surely. then, it is naive and confusing to think of detention as lawful only if the previous
tribunal's proceedings were 'correct' in this ultimate sense. If any detention whatever is to be
validated, the concept of 'lawfulness' must be defined in terms more complicated than 'actual'
freedom from error: or, if you will, the concept of 'freedom from error' must eventually include a
notion that some complex of institutional processes is empowered definitively to establish whether
or not there was error, even though in the very nature of things no such processes can give us
ultimate assurances . . . .").
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sentencing guidelines." 274 The dissent downplayed these concerns indicating
that where finality does not promote the principles of confidence in the judicial
system, minimization of cost and delay, avoidance of spoliation of evidence, or
comity, it should not be the focus of attention. 2
On the other hand, the Gilbert dissenters expressed concerns of their own.
although theirs' were constitutional in nature.
The dissenters opined that
denying relief to a prisoner in Gilbert's position raised grave constitutional
concerns, including a violation of Article I's Suspension Clause.277 Moreover,
the dissenters asked how a court system-a system that is supposed to stand for
justice and fairness-could turn its back on Gilbert after incorrectly applying a
sentencing enhancement, incorrectly affirming that sentence, and then not
allowing him to re-raise his wrongfully rejected arguments after those arguments
were finally adopted by the highest Court in the land.2
Despite the strong rhetoric used by both sides of the Gilbert debate, and
notwithstanding the many concerns expressed by each, a possible middle-ground
approach exists. This proposed approach can be summarized as follows: In
unique and relatively rare cases, like Gilbert, where a prisoner who has already
filed a § 2255 motion can show that, due to a subsequent change in the law
which has been made retroactively applicable, his sentence should have been
significantly shorter, and where that prisoner can also show that he could not
have raised the sentencing argument in his initial § 2255 motion, the savings
clause of § 2255(e) would kick in to allow that prisoner to file a § 2241 habeas
petition to challenge the length of his sentence.
The extremely narrow nature of this rule, and the class of prisoners to which
it would apply, is such that any resulting abuse or delay would be minimal, at
best.
Further, as an added layer of protection, strict judicial screening
procedures could be applied to assure that only those petitions that meet the
specific requirements of this proposed rule would be allowed through. As for the
specifics of these screening procedures, there are two options. The first is to
apply the normal screening procedures set forth in § 2244(b), under which a
prisoner must file a motion for leave with the court of appeals, at which time a
three-judge panel must decide, within thirty days, whether to authorize the
29
The second option is to apply Rule 4 of
district court to consider the petition.
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to screen out frivolous or otherwise
improper petitions. o Under that Rule, the judge who receives a habeas

274. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1309-10.
275. Id. at 1334 (Martin, J., dissenting).
276. See id at 1333.
277. See id
278. Id. at 1330 (citing United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11 th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 73 (11th Cir. 1998), abrogatedbyArcher, 531 F.3d 1347).
279. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006): see also supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text
(explaining in detail §2244(b)).
280. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [hereinafter HABEAS RULES], Rule 4. Although that Rule specifically
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petition-normally a Magistrate Judge-must promptly examine the petition
and, "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the )udge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner."
Under the middleground approach proposed in this Article, a screening judge who promptly
reviews a § 2241 habeas petition filed by a prisoner who has already filed a
§ 2255 motion for relief on the same grounds, would dismiss that habeas petition
unless it appeared from the face of the petition that the prisoner met both of the
proposed requirements: (1) That due to a retroactively applicable subsequent
change in the law, his sentence should have been significantly shorter; and (2)
He could not have raised the argument in his initial § 2255 motion.282 If the
screening judge determines that both of these showings have been made, the
petition would be allowed through, and normal habeas procedures would then
apply. Either of these screening procedures would prevent the proposed middle-

deals withi motions filed by state prisoners under § 2254, Rule 1 of that section provides that "[t]he
district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule
I(a)." Id. Rule 1(b).
281. Id. Rule 4.
282. In lieu of, or in addition to, § 2244(b) or Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases, some courts might choose to apply the screeing provisions of the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2006). That provision states: "The court shall review.
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee ofa
governmental entity." Id. 1915A(a). That statute goes on to discuss the grounds for dismissal:
"On review, the cowl shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the complaint-(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted .....
Id. § 1915A(b). Application of this statute would have the added
benefit that petitions could be screened even before they were docketed by the court clerk.
However, the majority of circuits have held that habeas petitions are not considered "civil actions"
for purposes of § 1915A. See, e.g., Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997)
("[R]eview of the entire statute confirms ... that the PLRA was not intended to apply in habeas
corpus."); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 741 (10th Cir. 1997). overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (concluding,
in accordance with other circuits, that habeas corpus proceedings are not "civil actions" under
§ 1915); Naddi v. Hill, 106 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that provisions of the PLRA
regarding "civil actions ... do not apply to habeas proceedings"); United States v. Cole, 101 F.3d
1076, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Congress distinguished procedures to be followed in habeas actions
from those used in other civil litigation," and, therefore, the PLRA is "inapplicable to habeas
petitions."); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that habeas corpus
petitions are not "civil actions" under the PLRA. and to find othenvise would undermine
Congressional intent); Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 1996) (indicating that
habeas petitions are not "civil actions" for the purposes of the PLRA); Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676,
678 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that the "civil action" language of the PLRA does not apply to habeas
corpus proceedings). Accordingly. in these circuits, cowls would have to apply the screening
provisions of § 2244(b) or Rule 4, as opposed to § 1915A. Finally, another statute that requires the
quick screening of habeas petitions is 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which provides: "A court, justice or judge
entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an
order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears
from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(2006).
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ground approach from "eviscerating" the AEDPA's second or successive
motions bar or opening the flood ates of post-conviction relief litigation and
destroying finality of judgment, N while at the same time preventing the
AEDPA's restriction on second or successive motions from violating the
Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause.
Under this narrowly tailored middle-ground approach, a subsequent habeas
petition would not be allowed through unless the screening judge determined,
from the face of the petition, that there exists a substantial likelihood that the
petitioner's sentence would have been significantly shorter in light of the
subsequent change in the law.m This would eliminate two categories of casescases in which it is not clear that the petitioner's sentence would have been any
shorter, even in light of the subsequent change in the law; and cases where, even
if the petitioner's sentence would likely have been shorter, the requested relief
would not significantly shorten the sentence.285 Further, a petition would not be
allowed through unless it was clear that the requested relief would make an
actual impact on the amount of time remaining on the petitioner's sentence (for
example, where a petitioner was incorrectly sentenced to 120 months, but had
already served 115 months by the time he filed his petition, his petition would be
dismissed at the screening stage).286 Additionally, under the proposed rule, a

283. See supra notes 162 63 and accompanying text.
284. This "substantial likelihood" standard finds support in another area of the law in which a
district court is required to exercise its "screening" duties-motions for preliminary injunctions. In
that context, a district court may grant a preliminary injunction only where the moving party
demonstrates, among other things, "a substantial likelihood of success on the merits." Keeton v.
Anderson Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v.
MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., LLC, 425 F.3d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 2005)).
285. What would amount to a "significantly" lighter sentence under this proposed rule, of
course, would be open for interpretation and not easily susceptible to a bright-line standard.
However, this is not unlike many areas of the law where courts must exercise their discretion in the
absence of a bright-line rule. As the Supreme Court has stated in relation to another area of
criminal procedure, "[m]uch as a 'bright line' rule would be desirable ... common sense and
ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
685 (1985).
286. Gilbert. himself. would have met this standard. First, the sentencing judge in Gilbert
clearly indicated that, had he had the opportunity to impose a lighter sentence, he would have. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text. Second, it is clear that had Gilbert been properly sentenced,
his maximum sentence under the guidelines would have been 188 months, as opposed to the
minimum sentence of 292 months that applied in light of the enhancement. See supra notes 123 24
and accompanying text. Accordingly, at a minimum, Gilbert's sentence would have been 104
months-or over eight years-shorter without the sentencing enhancement. A more likely scenario.
however, in light of the sentencing Judge's statements on the record, would have been a sentence of
151 months (the minimum sentence without the enhancement), which would have been 141 months,
or nearly twelve years, shorter than Gilbert's actual sentence. The Gilbert majority even assumed
that. without the enhancement. Gilbert's sentence would have been "substantially lighter." Gilbert
v. United States. 640 F.3d 1293. 1304 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). But see supra notes 150-57 and
accompanying text (discussing why these assumptions might not be accurate). Finally, at the time
Gilbert filed his second motion, he still had more than ten years remaining on his sentence. See
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petition would be dismissed at the screening stage if the screening judge
determined that the petitioner could have raised the sentencing argument in his
initial § 2255 motion but failed to do so. This would significantly narrow the
number of cases in which a petitioner could take advantage of § 2255(e)'s
savings clause and file a § 2241 petition.
This proposed middle-ground approach is certainly susceptible to criticism
in that it would give screening judges leeway in determining, as an initial matter,
which petitions would be let through and which would be quickly dismissed as
frivolous or otherwise improper. This general criticism, however, can be levied
against any statute containing language open for interpretation, including the
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) itself. For instance, the PLRA's
screening provision states that a prisoner complaint should be dismissed upon
initial screening if it "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
287
relief may be granted."
This standard, which requires a judge to decide which
complaints are "frivolous," "malicious," or both, clearly allows room for a
screening judge to exercise considerable discretion. Despite this ambiguity,
however, all indications are that the PLRA has been successful in decreasing
prisoner filings in federal court.288
Further, the fact that judges would have to spend valuable time and
resources to screen habeas petitions in order to determine whether a petition
meets the criteria of this proposed rule is no different from what judges must do
under existing law. Currently, even in urisdictions such as the Eleventh Circuit
where such petitions are not allowed,
prisoners can, and very frequently do,
file improper habeas petitions in federal court.290 Those petitions have to be
screened by a judge-or by a three-jud e panel of the court of appeals under
§ 2244(b}-before they are dismissed.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that
applying the proposed rule would result in a significant increase in a judge's
screening duties.

Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1300, 1301 (indicating that Gilbert was sentenced to 292 months imprisonment
in 1997 and filed his second § 2255 motion in 2009).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2006).
288. See Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 595 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Margo Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (2003)) (noting that, in 1995, the year before the PLRA
was enacted, "prisoners filed 39,008 federal civil-rights suits, or 24.6 suits per 1,000 inmates" and
that, "[i]n 2001, they filed 22,206 such suits, at a rate of 11.4 per 1,000 inmates"); PRISONER
PETITIONS, supra note 262, at I (noting that, since enactment of the PLRA, the number of prisoner
filings in district court has decreased): STATISTICS DIV., supra note 269, at 11 (noting that prisoner
filings have been "markedly reduced" by the PLRA).
289. See Gilbert,640 F.3d at 1323.
290. See STATISTICS Div., supra note 269, at II.
291. Both the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and § 2243 provide for the judicial
screening of post-conviction relief petitions and motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006); HABEAS
RULES, supra note 280, Rule 4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006) (requiring a three-judge panel
of the court of appeals to authorize the filing of a second or successive application).
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V. CONCLUSION

As the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Gilbert illustrates, there exists a very
real and contentious debate regarding the availability of post-conviction relief to
a prisoner who has already filed a § 2255 motion, but, after that motion is
decided, a retroactively applicable change in the law renders that prisoner's
sentence incorrect. One side of the debate, illustrated by the Gilbert majority,
argues that allowing a prisoner in such a situation to skirt the AEDPA's
restrictions on second or successive motions would have a "finality-busting
effect[],"m9 2 and lead to habeas abuse and unnecessary delay. The other side,
illustrated by the Gilbert dissenters, raises constitutional concerns-specifically,
that denying a prisoner in such a situation any relief amounts to a violation of
Article I's Suspension Clause, as well as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Despite the often sharp rhetoric from both sides of the debate, this Article
has proposed a narrowly tailored middle-ground approach. Under that approach,
a subsequent habeas petition would not be allowed through unless a screening
judge determined, from the face of the petition, that there exists a substantial
likelihood that the petitioner's sentence would have been significantly shorter in
light of a retroactively applicable subsequent change in the law. Further, under
this proposed approach, a petition would not be allowed through unless it was
clear that the requested relief would make an actual impact on the amount of
time remaining on the petitioner's sentence. Finally, a petition would be
dismissed at the screening stage if the screening judge determined that the
petitioner could have raised the sentencing argument in his initial § 2255 motion
but failed to do so. If all of these requirements are established, however, the
petitioner would be allowed to file a habeas petition by way of § 2255(e)'s
savings clause. This narrowly tailored approach would prevent a flood of postconviction relief litigation while also avoiding the constitutional concerns that
have arisen.

292. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1309.
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